What ICI’s break-up reveals about UK chemical industry and the future of manufacturing

Overview

This article from The Conversation recounts Janet Godsell’s early days at ICI Huddersfield and traces how Britain’s largest chemical group was dismantled in the 1990s as policy shifted toward high‑value products. It emphasizes ICI’s integrated, ecosystem‑driven approach that linked raw materials, energy, laboratories, plants and communities, and shows how the break-up altered the UK’s chemical capabilities even as spin‑offs like Zeneca (AstraZeneca) and Syngenta flourished.

• ICI’s integrated “powerhouse” model shows how chemistry thrives through networked plants and shared utilities.
• The breakup prioritized high‑value medicines and biosciences, risking long‑term supply chain resilience.
• Modernisation now relies on clusters that share power, steam, water and waste treatment to preserve critical capabilities.
• People and training matter as much as plants for keeping a high‑tech chemical industry viable in a costly economy.

Author: The Conversation. Based on Janet Godsell’s account and The Conversation’s analysis of the UK chemical sector.

Introduction

The Conversation’s article traces the arc of ICI from its formation in 1926 to its dismantling in the 1990s, drawing on Janet Godsell’s memories of Huddersfield and Castner‑Kellner. It sets the scene with ICI’s powerhouse site, a self-contained system that produced steam, electricity, water and effluent treatment while housing engineers, researchers, apprentices and maintenance crews. The piece argues that ICI did more than make chemicals; it tied together materials, energy, people and places into an industrial ecosystem that could invest in talent and wait years for returns.

A company, a network and a community

ICI’s growth across Britain’s chemical heartlands created an integrated network rather than isolated factories. Its Wilton works on Teesside epitomised an upstream/downstream dynamic where basic chemicals fed downstream products, enabling a circular economy in which outputs from one plant could become inputs elsewhere within a single ownership. ICI’s commitment to developing people went beyond the factory fence: sponsored overseas placements, international exchanges, apprenticeships and strong links to technical colleges and social clubs helped forge local identities around the works. The article notes how this long‑term perspective was quietly revolutionary, embedding a capability that extended beyond bricks and pipes into a culture of collaboration.

The attraction of the clever end

By the late 20th century, European bulk chemicals faced tougher economics due to energy intensity, feedstock costs and global competition from cheaper regions. The article contends that a shift toward high‑value chemicals—driven by patents, regulatory environments and close customer relationships—made the value proposition more attractive, even if it required different capabilities. ICI’s 1993 demerger split the group into Zeneca, a pharmaceutical/biosciences powerhouse, and a re‑shaped ICI focusing on paints, plastics and bulk chemicals. This realignment was followed by heavy borrowing to acquire Unilever’s speciality chemicals division, and over the next decade, many businesses were sold off. The 2008 acquisition of ICI by AkzoNobel marked the final dissolution of the old conglomerate. A simplified diagram in the piece shows the fate of various components, including AstraZeneca, Syngenta and other assets, revealing how the strategic intent of the break‑up diverged from the broader ecosystem ICI had built.

The chemicals nobody notices until they are gone

The article emphasizes that some inputs—ammonia, ethylene crackers and solvent recovery units—are essential for local supply chains. When such inputs disappear or are relocated, entire value chains can be disrupted even if the final products keep moving. CF Fertilisers’ ammonia plant closure at Billingham in 2023 and the Olefins 6 cracker closure at Wilton (commissioned by ICI in 1979) illustrate how a single plant’s departure can alter a regional system, forcing feedstock to be imported or sourced from distant locations. The piece highlights a broader lesson: chemical capability can disappear even when the factory gates remain open, because the knowledge, skills and interdependencies that made the site viable have eroded or relocated abroad.

What a British chemical works looks like now

Today’s chemical campuses host several firms sharing utilities and services under contract rather than a single corporate umbrella. Huddersfield is now owned by Syngenta and continues to make active ingredients, while Indaver is exploring solvent recycling on the site. Tata Chemicals Europe uses a combined heat and power setup and carbon capture to feed a sodium bicarbonate plant, illustrating how proximity and shared utilities underpin circular manufacturing and resilience, even as ownership changes. The article argues that modern integration is less about a centralized empire and more about a network of collaborations that keeps critical inputs and processes connected.

The global bargain is fraying

The piece traces how the logic of locating activities where they are cheapest weakened the resilience of European chemical systems. The 2008 financial crisis, Brexit, COVID disruptions, and geopolitical shocks—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Iran’s strategic position—have shown that long supply chains are vulnerable to credit constraints, energy price volatility and geopolitical tensions. Cefic and ONS data show a declining share of European chemical sales relative to China, while the UK’s own production data reveal a post‑2020 peak followed by a downward trend and ongoing site closures. The central argument is that a purely cost‑focused supply chain neglects the hidden costs of disruption, and a more resilient approach requires maintaining dense, near‑market networks with integrated utilities and knowledge sharing.

The best way forward

The authors advocate a selective, cluster‑based approach to policy. They propose identifying a limited set of chemicals and capabilities whose loss would threaten multiple industries, such as fertilisers, industrial gases, water‑treatment chemicals, and battery materials. They argue for policy support that enables clusters to share low‑carbon power, steam, water and wastewater treatment, along with solvent recovery and by‑product valorisation. Before closing a major plant, policymakers should assess the impact on neighboring firms, not only the owner’s balance sheet. A key emphasis is on people: plants depend on operators who blend deep process knowledge with digital systems and decarbonisation expertise, and once dispersed, this know‑how is hard to recreate. The piece concludes that Britain was right to value the clever end of chemistry, but wrong to assume cleverness could thrive indefinitely without a supporting industrial base.

Conclusion

The article closes with a sobering message: there is no simple path to reshoring all production. Instead, Britain should pursue a restrained, networked strategy, preserving clusters and capabilities that anchor wider industrial activity, while investing in people and collaborative, low‑carbon infrastructure. The legacy of ICI offers both a warning and a blueprint for how to balance innovation with practical, place‑based manufacturing capabilities in a high‑cost economy.